US-Bangladesh relations might change if Trump comes to power: Kugelman

With Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus embarking on his first visit to the United States as head of the Bangladesh government to attend the 79th UNGA, where he will have a bilateral meeting with President Joe Biden on the sidelines, UNB spoke to Michael Kugelman (MK), director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Centre, about the gamut of relations between the two countries.

UNB: Are we witnessing a substantive reset in relations between Dhaka and Washington?

MK: It’s less of a reset and more an assertion of continuity. We’re seeing an emphasis on economic and development cooperation. This is a long standing and productive aspect of the relationship that’s been overlooked in recent years amid all the tensions over democracy and elections.

The US is a top trade partner of Bangladesh, a prime source of FDI, and a major donor on issues ranging from public health to Rohingya refugees. It appears, at a moment when Bangladesh is facing a range of challenges on many fronts, that the US is keen to signal that it wants to help Bangladesh move forward. This isn’t to suggest other key components of the relationship, like strategic cooperation and indeed human rights, are being jettisoned. But in the immediate term they will likely take a back seat.

UNB: Does the makeup of the interim government, in particular it being led by Prof. Yunus, make a difference?

MK: Dr Yunus is a stabilising factor in US-Bangladesh relations, because he is a leader the US is comfortable working with and he is keen to engage with Washington. But Yunus factor aside, the relationship is actually following a track that began earlier this year, after Bangladesh’s election, when the Biden administration essentially signaled that it’s ready for a fresh start with the relationship. Yunus’s arrival in power will ensure that an earlier reset in bilateral relations continues to play out.

UNB: We know how the US and particularly the Biden administration, had been increasingly calling out the Sheikh Hasina regime to the extent it could since 2021 on its undemocratic ways. Would you say her fate in the end vindicated the US position to some extent?

MK: Certainly, Hasina’s increasingly autocratic tactics—flagged publicly by Washington for several years—were in the end what resulted in her ouster. But the US was not trying to draw links between concerns about democracy and free and fair elections and Hasina’s political survivability. It was more that the US chose to apply, with great vigour, its values-based foreign policy in Bangladesh—one that sought to encourage a free and fair election that, by Washington’s own admission, did not materialise.

UNB: There is a school of thought that some of the warmth and camaraderie witnessed during the recent US delegation’s visit may no longer be there if the Democrats lose the White House in November. How much credence would you lend that?

MK: I’m not sure I’d say there were unusual displays of warmth and camaraderie during the visit. It appeared to be what you’d expect for a standard series of cordial meetings. But the wider question is worth contemplating: Would the US relationship with Yunus-led Bangladesh—and the vibes accompanying it—change if Trump returns to the presidency? Indeed I think it would, albeit not dramatically.

Yunus has been critical of Trump in the past, and if Trump hasn’t forgotten that, there could be some effects on the relationship. Additionally, several of the areas that have become priorities for cooperation in the Biden era—especially climate change collaborations and development and humanitarian assistance—may receive less enthusiasm from a Trump administration.

But on other fronts I would expect continuity. If Trump believes the US gets a lot out of its robust trade relationship with Bangladesh, then that would remain intact. He would also, like the Biden administration—whether rightly or wrongly—look at Bangladesh through a great power competition lens, and try to disincentivize Dhaka from moving too close to Beijing.

UNB: How was the movement that eventually toppled the AL government on 5 August viewed by South Asia-watchers in the US? When did you get a sense that something serious was going on here?

MK: The pivotal moment during the movement was when the full scale of the repressive response to the protests came into sharp relief. Once Hasina’s security forces began using egregious levels of force—much more than during previous crackdowns against peaceful dissent—it became clear that her days in power would be numbered.

At that point here, attention turned to the “what next” questions. How much longer would she hold on to power? Who would replace her? Would stability be restored?

There’s a lot less uncertainty now than there was in August. But I think for many of us closely watching developments from DC, there continues to be interest—and some concern—about what’s coming: What will be the fate of the reform plans? What will that mean for election prospects? And how will the government deal with so many immediate challenges, like the economy and—let’s be honest about this—the increased political space afforded to hardline Islamist forces? I know that for many in Bangladesh there is a great sense of hope and optimism, but also that many are concerned—about political uncertainty, the economy, security threats, and the like. It will fall to Yunus and his advisors to manage these complex public sentiments.

UNB: I’m sure you’ve come across the view, largely propagated by the Indian media, but finding currency in Russia and China too, that the US had pulled off one of its so-called “colour revolutions” here. What do you say to that?

MK: I’ve shouted myself hoarse from many rooftops for many weeks insisting that this allegation is false. But I do recognize that those that believe this conspiracy theory have their minds made up and won’t be dissuaded. I also recognize that China and Russia have a strategic interest in endorsing narratives that make the US look bad. And I recognize as well that there are those that will simply assume the worst about US policy intentions, given past US policies in Bangladesh and the region.

But let’s be clear: This movement was driven by purely internal factors, above all the Hasina government’s egregious uses of force to crack down on peaceful protestors, which was the straw that broke the camel’s back for a public already harbouring so much pent-up anger against years of repression and growing economic stress. To ascribe an external hand to these purely internally driven developments would be to deny not only the truth, but also agency to masses of young people.

Yes, the mass movement brought to power Yunus, a close friend of Washington. But it also led to a new government that may be inclined to push closer to China, and keep some distance from India. And it has created more space for hardline Islamists to take on more political influence (such influence likely contributed to the recent decision to release from prison an Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist leader). These outcomes don’t serve US interests, and in fact they bring the US into alignment with India. That’s telling, given all the recent commentary about the US and India not seeing eye to eye in Bangladesh.

UNB: At the moment, as you probably know, handing the country back to elected representatives through elections has taken a back seat. How comfortable do you think Washington is with that?

MK: My sense is Washington understands that the interim government needs time to make progress on the reform front prior to elections. And I think it understands Dhaka’s view that rushing to elections without institutional reforms would not stabilise Bangladesh, and that ironically restoring democracy would become more difficult.

That said, if a year or two goes by, progress is lagging on reforms, and the economy isn’t stabilising, that would make the public increasingly impatient, centre attention on the interim government’s lack of a mandate, and possibly prompt the US to change its position and to encourage elections in the interest of democracy and stability.

UNB: Finally as a South Asia expert, how do you see the strategic realignment taking place in the region as a result of 5 August playing out? What does Beijing make of it all, and how would you expect it to react?

MK: I wouldn’t overstate the notion of a strategic realignment. The biggest change is that India has lost a close friend in Hasina and must make some tough decisions about how to rebuild relations with Dhaka. But otherwise, I see plenty of continuity. There is multi-partisan support in Bangladesh—as there is in many South Asian capitals—in favour of good relations with Beijing, mainly due to commercial interests. The Yunus government will want to work with China. The same goes for his approach to Russia. While Yunus is close to Washington, I don’t think that means he will try to distance Dhaka from Beijing and Moscow. They provide assistance in key sectors—infrastructure, energy—that’s especially important now, at a moment of economic fragility.

I anticipate that the Yunus government, while it may be willing to move closer to Beijing (though let’s remember Hasina moved closer to Beijing too!) and won’t worry about upsetting India if it does so, will maintain the same general nonalignment position that previous governments have. In an era of intense great power competition, a familiar hedging policy is likely, with efforts to balance ties with the US, China, Russia, and—if New Delhi is receptive to it—India.